Dog Bite Lawyer: Rhode Island Dog Bite Law

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TITLE 4. ANIMALS AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

CHAPTER 13. DOGS

R.I. Gen. Laws § 4-13-16 (2002)

§ 4-13-16. Action for damages to animals -- Double damages on second recovery -- Destruction of offending dog

If any dog kills, wounds, worries, or assists in killing, wounding or worrying, any sheep, lamb, cattle, horse, hog, swine, fowl, or other domestic animal belonging to or in the possession of any person, or assaults, bites, or otherwise injures any person while traveling the highway or out of the enclosure of the owner or keeper of that dog, the owner or keeper of the dog shall be liable to the person aggrieved, for all damage sustained, to be recovered in a civil action, with costs of suit. If afterwards any such damage is done by that dog, the owner or keeper of the dog shall pay to the party aggrieved double the damage, to be recovered in the manner set forth and an order shall be made by the court before whom that second recovery is made, for killing the dog. The order shall be executed by the officer charged with the execution of the order, and it shall not be necessary, in order to sustain this action, to prove that the owner or keeper of the dog knew that the dog was accustomed to causing this damage.

HISTORY: G.L. 1896, ch. 111, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 135, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 136, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 639, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 4-13-16.

NOTES:

COLLATERAL REFERENCES. Anguish at property damage by or to dog. 28 A.L.R.2d 1070.

Constitutionality of law making owner liable for damage done by dog. 49 A.L.R. 847.

Contributory negligence as a defense to a cause of action based upon violation of statute imposing duty upon keeper of animals. 10 A.L.R.2d 853.

Excessiveness of verdict in action for injury by dog bite. 46 A.L.R. 1277; 102 A.L.R. 1125.

Highways, liability for damages due to dog interfering with travel in. 11 A.L.R. 270.

Inadequate damages for injuries by dog. 16 A.L.R.2d 1368.

Injury by dog as wilful or malicious injury so as to preclude it or judgment procured on it from operation of bankruptcy discharge. 26 A.L.R.2d 1368.

Joint liability of several independent owners of dogs for injury by them. 9 A.L.R. 946; 35 A.L.R. 409; 91 A.L.R. 759.

Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee. 74 A.L.R.4th 1120.

Liability of owner or operator of place of public resort for injury to patron by dog. 17 A.L.R.2d 459.

Presence of owner as affecting liability for killing trespassing dog. 42 A.L.R. 437.

Public service corporation's employee entering premises, liability for injury to, by dog. 2 A.L.R. 1389.

Rabid dog, liability for injuries inflicted by. 13 A.L.R. 492.

Show, liability for injury inflicted by dog exhibited at. 80 A.L.R.3d 507.

Statute eliminating scienter as condition of liability. 1 A.L.R. 1114; 142 A.L.R. 436.

Trespassing dog, owner or keeper of, as liable for damages. 107 A.L.R. 1323.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Purpose and Effect of Statute.

2. Construction with Other Sections.

3. Basis of Liability.

4. --Landlord.

5. Character of Dog.

6. Scienter or Knowledge.

7. Enclosures.

8. Injuries for Which Recovery Allowed.

9. Form of Action.

10. Federal Immunity.

1. PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF STATUTE.

One purpose of enacting this section was to relieve the plaintiff from the burden of proving knowledge of the previous acts and character of the dog but this was not the only purpose and the words "or otherwise injure any person" were broad enough to sustain an action for indirect injuries. Malafronte v. Miloni, 35 R.I. 225, 86 A. 146 (1913).

2. CONSTRUCTION WITH OTHER SECTIONS.

This section should be construed as harmoniously as possible with § 4-13-18. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

3. BASIS OF LIABILITY.

Liability of a defendant for damages done by dog outside his premises is not conditioned upon his negligence or fault in permitting or enabling the dog to leave the premises. Palmer v. Saccocia, 33 R.I. 476, 82 A. 265 (1912).

The clause "while traveling on the highway or out of the enclosure of the owner or keeper of such dog" modifies the word "person" and not the word "dog." Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

4. --LANDLORD.

An out-of-possession landlord was not liable for injuries sustained by person bitten outside leased premises by dog owned by tenant where landlord did not have knowledge of dog's presence on premises. Lindsay v. Crohan, 508 A.2d 674 (1986).

5. CHARACTER OF DOG.

Evidence of prior peaceable habits of the dog was not admissible either as a defense or in mitigation of damages. Kelly v. Alderson, 19 R.I. 544, 37 A. 12 (1896).

In an action for injuries resulting from a dog bite, the peaceable character of the dog was not material, because the statute has enlarged the common law liability of the dog's owner or keeper. Whittet v. Bertsch, 39 R.I. 31, 97 A. 18 (1916).

6. SCIENTER OR KNOWLEDGE.

For a person to recover for injuries for dog bite under this section without proof of defendant's scienter, he must have been out of the enclosure of the owner or keeper of the dog. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

Person bitten by dog while in enclosure set apart from adjoining property by boundaries sufficiently apparent to indicate approximate limits where dog might be kept is not under provisions of this section, even though there are intervals in the line, and the plaintiff is required by common law to allege and prove scienter of the keeper. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

This section provides for an owner's or keeper's liability absent proof of negligence or fault. Brotko v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 78 (D.R.I. 1989).

7. ENCLOSURES.

The premises of the keeper of a dog not surrounded by a fence, ditch, or hedge was not an enclosure within the meaning of this section. Whittet v. Bertsch, 39 R.I. 31, 97 A. 18 (1916). See also Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

The meaning of the word "enclosure" is the same in this section and § 4-13-18. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

The word "enclosure" denotes occupied premises set apart from adjoining premises by boundaries sufficiently apparent to indicate the approximate limits of occupation. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

The important thing in determining whether a dog is within an enclosure is that there be something to give a man reasonable notice that he is entering upon occupied premises where there may be a dog. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

Plaintiff bitten by dog while on the keeper's premises which were entirely enclosed by stone walls and other visible and tangible obstructions, except for driveway entrance, was in defendant's enclosure as defined by this section and was required to allege and prove scienter of defendant, as required by common law, to avoid directed verdict. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

The purpose of the enclosure is to give the entrant reasonable notice that he is entering upon occupied premises where there may be a dog and the requisite notice is afforded if the premises are set apart from adjoining property by boundaries sufficiently apparent to indicate the approximate limits of occupation. Bernhart v. Nine, 120 R.I. 692, 391 A.2d 75 (1978).

Where there were no signs, fences, gates or other barriers and nothing to warn the general public that there was a dog running loose on the land, there was no enclosure under this section and it was not error to award damages for a dog bite. Lamoureux v. Davis, 504 A.2d 449 (1986).

The term "enclosure" includes not only a fence or physical obstruction but also any condition that will give reasonable notice that the land is private property. Butti v. Rossi, 617 A.2d 881 (R.I. 1992).

The trial court's directed verdict in favor of the defendant on the issue of whether the defendant had enclosed his property was improper since the question of whether an adequate enclosure existed was dependent on the credibility of witnesses. Butti v. Rossi, 617 A.2d 881 (R.I. 1992).

8. INJURIES FOR WHICH RECOVERY ALLOWED.

A plaintiff whose horse ran away as the result of being bitten by a dog and who was injured when the attached wagon collided with a curbstone could recover for the injuries in action on the case by virtue of the language "or shall assault or bite or otherwise injure any person." Malafronte v. Miloni, 35 R.I. 225, 86 A. 146 (1913).

The statute is broad enough to allow recovery for both direct and indirect damages. Pritsker v. Greenwood, 47 R.I. 384, 133 A. 656 (1926).

Plaintiff was entitled to recover medical expenses resulting from attack by defendant's dog on plaintiff's child while traveling on highway. Pritsker v. Greenwood, 47 R.I. 384, 133 A. 656 (1926).

9. FORM OF ACTION.

Action for injuries resulting from being bitten by a dog while traveling on the highway could be brought either in trespass or on the case. Barlow v. Tierney, 26 R.I. 557, 59 A. 930 (1905) (Decision prior to adoption of Rules of Civil Procedure providing for one form of action).

There was no variance between writ and declaration in suit for damages due to dog bite for failure of declaration to allege that dog bite was vi et armis, et contra pacem, since form of action was trespass in both writ and declaration. Barlow v. Tierney, 26 R.I. 557, 59 A. 930 (1905) (Decision prior to adoption of Rules of Civil Procedure providing for one form of action).

10. FEDERAL IMMUNITY.

The federal government may not be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) as a "harborer or keeper" of a dog which bites a child living in a military housing area, because Rhode Island dog bite law provides for strict liability, i.e., liability absent proof of scienter, negligence, or fault, and the FTCA precludes strict liability actions against the United States government. Brotko v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 78 (D.R.I. 1989).

TITLE 47. ANIMALS, LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY

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CHAPTER 3. DOGS AND OTHER DOMESTIC PETS

ARTICLE 2. LIABILITY TO PERSON BITTEN OR OTHERWISE ATTACKED BY DOG

S.C. Code Ann. § 47-3-110 (2002)

§ 47-3-110. Liability of owner or person having dog in his care or keeping.

Whenever any person is bitten or otherwise attacked by a dog while the person is in a public place or is lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care or keeping, the owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care or keeping is liable for the damages suffered by the person bitten or otherwise attacked. For the purposes of this section, a person bitten or otherwise attacked is lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care or keeping, when the person bitten or otherwise attacked is on the property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this State, by the ordinances of any political subdivision of this State, by the laws of the United States of America, including, but not limited to, postal regulations, or when the person bitten or otherwise attacked is on the property upon the invitation, express or implied, of the owner of the property or of any lawful tenant or resident of the property. If a person provokes a dog into attacking him then the owner of the dog is not liable.

HISTORY: 1986 Act No. 343.

NOTES:

RESEARCH AND PRACTICE REFERENCES--

4 Am Jur 2d, Animals § § 85 et seq.

3A C.J.S., Animals § § 170 et seq.

2 S.C. Juris. Animals § 6.

1 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Animals, Forms 91 et seq. (liability for injuries by animals).

33 Am Jur Trials 195, Pit Bulldog Attack Litigation.

Annual Survey of South Carolina Law: Torts. 38 SC L Rev 236 (Autumn 1986).

ANNOTATIONS--

Liability of owner or operator of place of public resort for injury to patron by dog harbored by him. 17 ALR2d 459.

Relative rights and liabilities as between landlord and tenant with respect to keeping of dogs, birds, or other pets. 18 ALR2d 880.

Injury by dog or other animal as wilful and malicious injury so as to preclude it or judgment procured on it from operation of bankruptcy discharge. 26 ALR2d 1368.

Contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or intentional provocation as defense to action for injury by dog. 66 ALR2d 916.

Liability to social guest injured by dog. 79 ALR2d 459.

Liability of owner of dog known by him to be vicious for injuries to trespasser. 64 ALR3d 1039.

Landlord's liability to third person for injury resulting from attack by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant. 81 ALR3d 638.

Personal injuries inflicted by animal as within homeowner's or personal liability policy. 96 ALR3d 891.

Liability of owner of dog for dog's biting veterinarian or veterinarian's employee. 4 ALR4th 349.

Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery. 7 ALR4th 607.

Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 ALR4th 986.

Who "harbors" or "keeps" dog under animal liability statute. 64 ALR4th 963.

Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 ALR4th 976.

Nonconsensual treatment of involuntarily committed mentally ill persons with neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs as violative of state constitutional guaranty. 74 ALR4th 1099.

CASE NOTES

1. In General

Even if owner of property on which dog owners lived did not have landlord/tenant relationship with dog owners, he was not liable to minor who was bitten by dog, as he was not the dog's owner or keeper; owner of property merely allowed dog to be kept on property on which he did not live, owner visited property but did not provide any care or support for dog, and dog owners were in almost complete control of animal. Bruce v. Durney (S.C.App. 2000) 341 S.C. 563, 534 S.E.2d 720, rehearing denied.

One who controls the use of property has a duty of care not to harm others by its use; conversely, one who has no control owes no duty. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

Whether individual would not have fallen and injured herself had owner's dog not jumped on her was question for jury in individual's action against dog owner for injuries sustained when dog allegedly jumped on her and caused her to fall off ramp. Elmore v. Ramos (S.C.App. 1997) 327 S.C. 507, 489 S.E.2d 663.

2. Strict liability

Proof of evil motive is not required to impose liability on dog owner, under statute imposing strict liability on owner of dog who bites or otherwise attacks another, for injuries caused by dog's jumping or pouncing upon victim. Elmore v. Ramos (S.C.App. 1997) 327 S.C. 507, 489 S.E.2d 663.

3. "Otherwise attacks"

Dog did not "otherwise attack" animal control officer whose shoulder was injured as she attempted to lift dog into her truck by its neck from end of pole, and thus, statute imposing strict liability on owners of dogs that bite or otherwise attack person without provocation was inapplicable in officer's action against dog's owners; officer conceded that dog never bit or touched her. Padgett v. Mercado (S.C.App. 2000) 341 S.C. 229, 533 S.E.2d 339.

Term "otherwise attacks", as used in statute imposing strict liability on owner of dog who "bites or otherwise attacks" another, includes situations where dog jumps on or pounces upon someone. Elmore v. Ramos (S.C.App. 1997) 327 S.C. 507, 489 S.E.2d 663.

4. Other animals

To recover damages for personal injuries, veterinarian kicked by horse was required to prove that horse owners knew or should have known that their horse had dangerous or vicious nature; rule holding dog owners liable for dog bites regardless of knowledge of dangerous propensities did not apply to horses. Henry v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1997) 327 S.C. 336, 489 S.E.2d 639, rehearing denied, certiorari denied.

5. Possession and control

Whether owners and inhabitants of residence at which minor child was attacked by dogs had sufficient possession and control of dogs and premises so as to impose liability upon them for injuries sustained by child in attack was question for jury. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

Partial owner of residence at which minor child was attacked by dogs, who inherited her interest in residence from her father, had not lived at residence for over five years, and did not take care of dogs, did not owe a duty to child injured in attack to control dogs and, thus, could not be liable for injuries sustained by child in attack. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

6. Licensee

Finding that minor child was a "licensee" and, thus, was lawfully on dog owners' property at time she was attacked by dogs, for purposes of statute imposing strict liability on dog owners for damages sustained by victim lawfully on property as result of dog bite or attack, was supported by testimony of child's father that he told one owner that his child would probably be on the property with him when he cut their lawn, and that other owner let father and child into the backyard and assured them that the dogs never bothered anyone. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

A "licensee" is a social guest or a person who is privileged to enter upon land by virtue of the possessor's consent. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

To be considered a "licensee," an individual's presence on the property must be for the primary benefit of the individual, not the owner. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

7. Damages

Punitive damages award to father, as guardian of minor child injured in attack by dogs, was not was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, where dogs were enclosed in fenced-in yard at time of accident, there was no evidence that dogs were ever allowed to roam freely, there was no evidence that any of dogs had ever attempted to attack anyone prior to attacking child, there were at least two offers by dog owners to put the dogs in the house if father was concerned about child being in yard with dogs, which father declined, and one of the owners had trusted her own grandchildren to play with dogs. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

A tort is characterized as reckless, willful, or wanton if it was committed in such a manner or under such circumstances that a person of ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of it as an invasion of the plaintiff's rights, for purposes of determining whether punitive damages should be awarded. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

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