Ohio Dog Bite Law

TITLE IX [9] AGRICULTURE -- ANIMALS -- FENCES  

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CHAPTER 955: DOGS  

 

[PROHIBITIONS]

 

 ORC Ann. 955.28  (Anderson 2002)

 

 

 §  955.28 Dog may be killed for certain acts; owner liable for damages. 

 

   (A) Subject to divisions (A)(2) and (3) of section 955.261 [955.26.1] of the Revised Code, a dog that is chasing or approaching in a menacing fashion or apparent attitude of attack, that attempts to bite or otherwise endanger, or that kills or injures a person or a dog that chases, injures, or kills livestock, poultry, other domestic animal, or other animal, that is the property of another person, except a cat or another dog, can be killed at the time of that chasing, approaching, attempt, killing, or injury. If, in attempting to kill such a dog, a person wounds it, he is not liable to prosecution under the penal laws which punish cruelty to animals.

(B) The owner, keeper, or harborer of a dog is liable in damages for any injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the dog, unless the injury, death, or loss was caused to the person or property of an individual who, at the time, was committing or attempting to commit a trespass or other criminal offense on the property of the owner, keeper, or harborer, or was committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense against any person, or was teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog on the owner's, keeper's, or harborer's property. 

 

HISTORY: 

: RS § §  4212-1, 4212-2; 93 v 128, 129; 94 v 118, § §  1, 2; GC §  5838; 124 v 428; Bureau of Code Revision, 10-1-53; 142 v H 352. Eff 7-10-87. 

 

NOTES:

 

CROSS-REFERENCES TO RELATED SECTIONS

   Examination of claim and reimbursement, RC § §  955.41, 955.42.

 

-COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION

   -Killing dogs:

   - CA--Food Code §  31101 et seq

   - FL--Stat Ann §  767.03

   - IL--Ann Stat ch 8 §  368

   - IN--Code §  15-5-7-2

   - KY--Rev Stat Ann §  258.235

   - MI--Comp Laws Ann §  287.279

   - NY--Agri Law §  121

   - PA--CSA tit 3 §  459-601 et seq, tit 34 §  2384, tit 53 § §  3912, 3913

   -Liability of dog owner:

   - CA--Food Code §  31501 et seq; Civil Code § §  3342, 3342.5

   - FL--Stat Ann §  767.01 et seq

   - IL--Ann Stat ch 8 §  366

   - IN--Code § §  15-5-7-1, 15-5-12-1

   - KY--Rev Stat Ann §  258.275

   - MI--Comp Laws Ann § §  287.280, 287.351

   - NY--Agri Law §  125

   - PA--CSA tit 3 § §  459-501 et seq, 459-701 et seq

 

TEXT DISCUSSION

   Liability for injury caused by dog. 2 Ohio Civ. Prac. §  19.02

   Strict liability for injury by animals. Premises Liability § §  8.16 to 8.19

 

FORMS

   Abusing dog on owner's property (standard instruction). 2 OJI 217.03

   Answer for dog bite. 2 Ohio Civ. Prac. §  19.11

   Answer for maliciously killing a dog. 2 Ohio Civ. Prac. §  19.15

   Common-law rule. 2 OJI 217.07

   Complaint for dog bite. 1 Ohio Civ. Prac. § §  2.27, 19.09

   Injury to trespasser (standard instruction). 2 OJI 217.05

   Interrogatories to defendant in dog bite case. 2 Ohio Civ. Prac. §  19.10

   Liability of owner of dog (standard instruction). 2 OJI 217.01

    Affirmative defenses. 2 OJI 217.03

 

RESEARCH AIDS

   Civil liability for violation of statute:

    O-Jur3d: Ani § §  75-85; Death §  44

    Am-Jur2d: Ani §  112 et seq

 

ALR

   Civil liability of landowner for killing or injuring trespassing dog. 15 ALR2d 578.

   Intentional provocation, contributory or comparative negligence, or assumption of risk as defense to action for injury by dog. 11 ALR5th 127.

   Keeping of dogs as enjoinable nuisance. 11 ALR3d 1399.

   Landlord's liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant. 89 ALR4th 374.

Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee. 74 ALR4th 1120.

   Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 ALR4th 986.

   Liability of owner of dog known by him to be vicious for injuries to trespasser. 64 ALR3d 1039.

   Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 ALR4th 976.

   Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dog bite. 51 ALR4th 446.

   Personal liability of public officer for killing or injuring animal while carrying out statutory duties with respect to it. 2 ALR3d 822.

   Who "harbors" or "keeps" dog under animal liability statute. 64 ALR4th 963.

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LAW REVIEW

   Dogs; liability for injury. Note. 5 OSLJ 433 (1939).

   Liability of dog owners (1951 Legislation). John E. Hallen. 12 OSLJ 343 (1951).

   Taking the bite out of pit bull attacks: Is there an answer? Comment. 15 ONorthLRev 83 (1989).

   Vicious-dog legislation -- controlling the pit bull: Am. Sub. H.B. 352: an overview -- dogs under control. Note. 13 DaytonULRev 297 (1988). 

 

                                CASE NOTES AND OAG

 

1. (1986) Assumption of the risk is not a permissible defense to an action for a dog bite brought pursuant to RC §  955.28: Pulley v. Malek, 25 OS3d 95, 25 OBR 145, 495 NE2d 402.

 

2. (1983) Action based on the liability created by RC §  955.28 for injuries caused by a dog is governed by RC §  2305.07, not 2305.10: Bora v. Kerchelich, 2 OS3d 146, 2 OBR 692, 443 NE2d 509.

 

3. (1964) This section, which imposes a rule of absolute liability upon the owner or harborer of a dog for damages or injury caused by such dog (with certain exceptions), creates a new and different cause of action in no way dependent upon common-law principles and does not abrogate the common-law right of action for damage or injury caused by a dog. A suit may be instituted either under the statute or at common law: Warner v. Wolfe, 176 OS 389, 27 OO2d 356, 199 NE2d 860.

 

4. (1954) This section imposes an absolute liability on the owner or keeper of a dog for any damage or injury caused by that dog, subject only to the exceptions contained in the second sentence of such section and the qualification that the actions of the dog were the proximate cause of the damage or injury: Hirschauer v. Davis, 163 OS 105, 56 OO 169, 126 NE2d 337.

 

5. (1954) An action for damages alleged to have been caused by a dog exists by reason of this section, is purely statutory, and is not based on negligence: Hirschauer v. Davis, 163 OS 105, 56 OO 169, 126 NE2d 337.

 

6. (1954) In an action for damages to personal property alleged to have been caused by a dog, the issues to be submitted to the jury are (1) ownership or keepership of the dog, (2) whether the actions of the dog were the proximate cause of the damages, and (3) the monetary amount of the damages: Hirschauer v. Davis, 163 OS 105, 56 OO 169, 126 NE2d 337.

 

7. (1924) One who has been injured by a dog may sue either at common law or under the statute: Lisk v. Hora, 109 OS 519, 143 NE 545.

 

8. (1924) An action for death by wrongful act may be brought where the death is due to injuries inflicted by a dog: Lisk v. Hora, 109 OS 519, 143 NE 545.

 

9. (1922) The owner of a dog which causes damages by chasing and worrying one who is driving an automobile is liable for such damage: Silverglade v. Von Rohr, 107 OS 75, 140 NE 669 [affirming judgment of court of appeals, which affirmed, Von Rohr v. Silverglade, 22 NP(NS) 333].

 

10. (1922) The liability imposed by this section is not dependent upon the negligence of such owner or keeper: Silverglade v. Von Rohr, 107 OS 75, 140 NE 669 [affirming 6 OApp 322, which affirmed Von Rohr v. Silverglade, 22 NP(NS) 333].

 

11. (1913) This and GC §  5839 (repealed 124 v 428) impose absolute liability on owner of the dog, and it is not necessary to allege or prove his knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog or his negligence in keeping him: Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 OS 61, 105 NE 192 [reversing 14 CC(NS) 511, 23 CD 221, which affirmed Buffon v. Kleybolte, 12 NP(NS) 80, 22 OD 362]; Job v. Harlan, 13 OS 485; Gries v. Zeck, 24 OS 329; Lisk v. Hora, 109 OS 519, 143 NE 545.

 

12. (1913) In an action for injuries inflicted by a dog, evidence tending to show the dog had bitten another person prior to the time the plaintiff was bitten, and that defendant had knowledge thereof, is inadmissible: Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 OS 61, 105 NE 192 [reversing 14 CC(NS) 511, which affirmed Buffon v. Kleybolte, 12 NP(NS) 80, 22 OD 362].

 

13. (1913) In an action brought under this section and GC §  5839 (repealed 124 v 428 [432]) for injuries inflicted by a dog, punitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable: Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 OS 61, 105 NE 192 [reversing 14 CC(NS) 511, which affirmed Buffon v. Kleybolte, 12 NP(NS) 80, 22 OD 362].

 

14. (1909) It is competent to prove that a dog had acquired a habit of attacking sheep, in support of a disputed allegation that he attacked and injured sheep on a particular occasion: Rumbaugh v. McCormick, 80 OS 211, 88 NE 410.

 

15. (1900) One may negligently keep and harbor a vicious dog, knowing him to be such, without being the owner of the animal; and he may thus keep and harbor a vicious dog without owning or controlling the premises where he may be kept, and he may be chargeable with notice of the viciousness of the dog through his neglect to take notice of his vicious habits: Hayes v. Smith, 62 OS 161, 56 NE 879.

 

16. (1900) When it has been shown that the animal has been kept after knowledge of his dangerous character has been acquired, or circumstances have been shown from which the law would imply knowledge, and an injury has followed, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence: Hayes v. Smith, 62 OS 161, 56 NE 879.

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17. (1900) Two or more persons may be joined as defendants in an action to recover damages for a personal injury inflicted by a vicious dog, which is negligently kept and harbored by such persons with knowledge that it was vicious and dangerous: Hayes v. Smith, 62 OS 161, 56 NE 879.

 

18. (1895) An injury caused by a dog belonging to one, which enters upon the premises of another is trespass: Morgan v. Hudnell, 52 OS 552, 40 NE 716, 49 AmSt 741, 27 LRA 862; Hayes v. Guard, 9 OApp 377.

 

19. (1874) Tenants in possession may be sued jointly for trespass by animals which are kept or harbored by them upon their common premises, although the several animals are owned by them separately and individually: Jack v. Hudnall, 25 OS 255.

 

20. (1873) In an action against two or more defendants in which the petition averred an injury caused by "a pack or lot of dogs owned, harbored and unlawfully kept by defendants" the fact that the evidence showed that one defendant owned some of the dogs and the other defendant owned others was not a material variance from such averment: McAdams v. Sutton, 24 OS 333.

 

20.1 (1998) A landlord can be liable for injuries caused by a tenant's dog only where the landlord acquiesces in the dog being kept in common areas or in an area shared by the landlord and tenant: Burgess v. Tackas, 125 OApp3d 294, 708 NE2d 285.

 

20.2 (1997) Dog owner was not entitled to directed verdict on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages when evidence was presented which indicated dog owner had knowledge of the vicious nature of the dog, yet allowed the dog to continue prowling the neighborhood; reasonable minds could conclude that dog owner acted with conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others: Cattaneo v. Taylor, No. 97-CA-45 (5th Dist.), 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 5886.

 

20.3 (1997) The owner of the campgrounds was not an owner, keeper or harborer of the dog: Root v. Thousand Adventures of Ohio, Inc., No. 96CA006477 (9th Dist.), 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1278.

 

20.4 (1996) A "keeper" of a dog is not a person protected by RC §  955.28(B): Johnson v. Allonas, 116 OApp3d 447, 688 NE2d 549.

 

20.5 (1995) A four-year-old cannot commit a crime or intentional act as a matter of law, but may still be found to be a trespasser for purposes of the affirmative defense for a dog bite: Padgett v. Sneed, No. C-940145 (1st Dist.), 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3012.

 

20.6 (1994) Both civil and criminal trespass are valid defense established by RC §  955.28(B): Bruggeman v. Fishbaugh, 96 OApp3d 200, 644 NE2d 1051.

 

20.7 (1994) Inasmuch as RC §  955.28(B) imposes strict liability for a dog bite, evidence of the dog's nonaggressive history toward children is irrelevant and inadmissible. Evidence that a child affectionately rubbed a dog while positioned between it and its food is not sufficient to prove that the child teased, tormented or abused it: Quellos v. Quellos, 96 OApp3d 31, 643 NE2d 1173.

 

21. (1993) By enacting RC §  955.28(B), the legislature intended to protect those people who are not in a position to control the dog. The legislature did not intend to protect those persons (the owner, keeper or harborer of the dog) who have, by the terms of the statute, an absolute duty to control the animal. A "keeper" is not within the class of people that the legislature intended to protect by enacting the strict liability provision contained in RC §  955.28(B). "Keepers" or "harborers" of dogs that proximately cause injury to them still have a common law cause of action against the dog's owner: Khamis v. Everson, 88 OApp3d 220, 623 NE2d 683.

 

22. (1992) Landlords out of possession can be found liable for injuries caused by animals owned and kept on the leased premises by the tenant where the landlord has knowledge of the dangerous animal but fails to take any action to have the animal removed or confined. A vendor under a land installment contract who retains only legal title to the property has no such liability: Flint v. Holbrook, 80 OApp3d 21, 608 NE2d 809.

 

23. (1992) A dog owner who would otherwise be liable under RC §  955.28 may be entitled to immunity under the workers' compensation laws: Horn v. Cassan, 78 OApp3d 353, 604 NE2d 816.

 

24. (1990) Proof of a compensable injury is an essential element of a claim under RC §  955.28: Jones v. Washington, 67 OApp3d 176, 586 NE2d 228.

 

25. (1988) An invitee who remains on the property of another person for purpose of his own, outside the scope of the invitation, does not thereby become a trespasser in the absence of his entering upon some clearly delimited part of the premises upon which his entry is not permitted: Dayton v. McLaughlin, 50 OApp3d 69, 552 NE2d 965.

 

26. (1984) Under RC §  955.28, the owner of a dog may be liable to a person "teasing, tormenting, or abusing" such dog if the dog were located anywhere other than on the owner's property at the time in question: Ramsey v. King, 14 OApp3d 138, 14 OBR 154, 470 NE2d 241.

 

27. (1984) As a matter of law, a three-year-old child is incapable of "teasing, tormenting, or abusing" a dog, within the meaning of RC §  955.28: Ramsey v. King, 14 OApp3d 138, 14 OBR 154, 470 NE2d 241.

 

28. (1983) Revised Code §  955.28, the dog bite statute, does not establish negligence per se; rather, the statute establishes liability without regard to fault or the dog owner's negligence: Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Associates Realty, Inc., 11 OApp3d 242, 11 OBR 368, 464 NE2d 169.

 

29. (1983) Where a dog owner is subjected to personal liability under RC §  955.28 as a direct result of the negligent or wrongful acts of a third person, the dog owner, or his subrogee, may maintain an action for indemnity against the negligent third party; however, if there is negligence of the dog owner which proximately contributes to the injury, he becomes a joint tortfeasor with the negligent third person, and an action seeking contribution is the appropriate recourse: Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Associates Realty, Inc., 11 OApp3d 242, 11 OBR 368, 464 NE2d 169.

 

30. (1982) The owner of an errant dog that strays upon the public highways is held to strict liability for the damage or harm caused by such straying: Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robison, 5 OApp3d 223, 5 OBR 508, 451 NE2d 253.

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31. (1982) The issues to be decided by the trier of facts in an action under RC §  955.28 are (1) ownership or keeping of the dog, (2) whether the actions of the dog were the proximate cause of the damage, and (3) the monetary amount of the damage: Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robison, 5 OApp3d 223, 5 OBR 508, 451 NE2d 253.

 

32. (1982) Revised Code §  955.28 imposes strict liability on the owner or keeper of a dog that causes injury, unless the injured person was trespassing on the property of the owner or teasing the dog: Garrard v. McComas, 5 OApp3d 179, 5 OBR 363, 450 NE2d 730.

 

33. (1959) Where a female dog, the day after giving birth to a litter of pups, attacks a small boy, who is in a room adjoining that in which such litter of pups is being kept and does not approach the pen where they are kept, and where such dog, after jumping out of the pen and running through a door, travels 20 feet or more to reach such boy, there is not shown any relationship between any protective instinct of such female dog and her conduct in attacking such boy; and the requirement of notice to the owner of such dog of its viciousness, as a necessary element for recovery at common law of punitive damages for harboring a vicious dog, is not proved: Tynan v. Hanlon, 110 OApp 77, 12 OO2d 252, 159 NE2d 769.

 

34. (1958) A dog on its master's premises is not a vagrant and cannot be said to be running at large: Perkins v. Hattery, 106 OApp 361, 7 OO2d 100, 155 NE2d 73.

 

35. (1958) The words, "chases, worries, injuries, or kills," as used in this section mean that, for the killing of a dog to be permitted, the dog must be killed while in the act of chasing, worrying, injuring, or killing: Perkins v. Hattery, 106 OApp 361, 7 OO2d 100, 155 NE2d 73.

 

36. (1947) It is not necessary for a pleader to expressly allege whether he is relying on the statute or on the common law. The facts pleaded will disclose that: McIntosh v. Doddy, 81 OApp 351, 37 OO 203, 79 NE2d 137.

 

37. (1947) Where only ownership or harboring is alleged and proven, the only liability established is that created by the statute, and that liability is limited to responding for actual damage: McIntosh v. Doddy, 81 OApp 351, 37 OO 203, 79 NE2d 137.

 

38. (1947) In order to state a cause of action under this section, for damage caused by a dog, it is not necessary to allege that the dog was vicious, that the defendant had knowledge of its vicious trait or negligence in any respect. Ownership or harboring is sufficient to impose liability: McIntosh v. Doddy, 81 OApp 351, 37 OO 203, 79 NE2d 137.

 

39. (1935) A man who discharged a gun at a dog which was fighting with his dog was held guilty of violating an ordinance making the discharge of firearms unlawful: McCollum v. Cincinnati, 51 OApp 67, 4 OO 49, 199 NE 603 [dismissed, 130 OS 159].

 

40. (1934) The owner and harborer of a dog were held jointly liable for injuries to a person bitten by the dog: Rosenblatt v. Bosse, 50 OApp 449, 4 OO 159, 198 NE 636.

 

41. (1933) The owner of a dog which jumped against a boy on roller skates, causing him to go into the street where he was struck by an automobile and injured, is liable for the injuries thus sustained: Bailey v. Prickett, 15 OLA 336 (App).

 

42. (1932) Employee who cared for dog held not precluded from recovering for injuries caused by dog: Bevin v. Griffiths, 44 OApp 94, 184 NE 401, 37 OLR 530.

 

43. (1932) Evidence that defendant employer harbored dog, which injured servant by moving rapidly against her, made issue for jury, in action for damages, though dog was not vicious or mischievous: Bevin v. Griffiths, 44 OApp 94, 184 NE 401, 37 OLR 530.

 

44. (1931) Suit may be maintained either under statute or at common law for injury caused by dogs known to be vicious: Roettinger v. Graser, 42 OApp 452, 181 NE 926.

 

45. (1930) Under this section owner of dog kept on premises is liable for damage to trespasser thereon by reason of bite of dog: Kingsley v. Yocom, 34 OApp 226, 170 NE 180.

 

46. (1928) One who owns or harbors a dog is liable for injuries inflicted by dog: Sawrey v. Grant, 31 OApp 14, 165 NE 97.

 

47. (1928) Two or more persons may harbor a dog and thus be jointly liable for injuries inflicted by bite of dog, under this section: Sawrey v. Grant, 31 OApp 14, 165 NE 97.

 

48. (1928) Joint recovery against husband and wife for injuries inflicted by dog owned by husband is justified under evidence that both spouses harbored dog: Sawrey v. Grant, 31 OApp 14, 165 NE 97.

 

49. (1926) One who wounds a dog trailing rabbits on his land and incidentally worrying sheep, and leaves it mangled, is not exempt from prosecution therefor under GC §  13376 (RC §  959.13), by reason of this section, relating to killing dogs worrying sheep, or by GC §  13361 (RC §  959.02) et seq, relative to offenses against domestic animals: Uebele v. State, 21 OApp 459, 153 NE 215.

 

50. (1915) For a discussion of what amounts to "harboring" a dog, see Mehmert v. Kelso, 6 OApp 69, 26 CC(NS) 350, 28 CD 515, 61 Bull 299.

 

51. (1908) In an action to recover damages resulting from plaintiff's being bitten by a dog which was owned or harbored by the defendant, the allegation that plaintiff was so bitten "without warning or provocation" on her part, is equivalent to the allegation that such occurrence was "without fault on her part": Tuttle v. Furi, 22 CC(NS) 388, 33 CD 626.

 

52. (1908) In an action to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff's being bitten by a dog which defendant owned or harbored, evidence that defendant had stated that the dog was "all right" and that he got good care and fresh water every day, and that defendant refused to permit the dog to be killed, together with evidence that the dog was seen about defendant's residence, is sufficient to justify the submission to the jury of the question whether defendant owned or harbored such dog: Tuttle v. Furi, 22 CC(NS) 388, 33 CD 626.

53. (1908) A minor may perhaps recover damages for loss of time due to an injury, if such injury prevents such minor from going to school, but if the loss of time took place in the summer, and the record does not show that the minor would have gone to school during such time, if it had not been for such injury, such minor cannot recover for such loss of time: Tuttle v. Furi, 22 CC(NS) 388, 33 CD 626.

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54. (1911) The words "such dog" used in the last sentence of this statute, is the same as "such dog" as previously used, and refers to a dog that chases, worries, injures or kills a sheep, lamb, kid, goat or domestic fowl or domestic animal or persons as far as liability of the owner for such injury or damage caused by the dog is concerned: Frerich v. Blake, 18 CC(NS) 466, 33 CD 163 [affirmed, without opinion, sub nomine, Blake v. Frerick, 88 OS 544].

 

55. (1911) A petition which states that the plaintiff was lawfully on the defendant's premises, and while there was bitten, without his fault, by the defendant's dog while it was running at large thereon in the day time, unmuzzled, shows a cause of action: Frerich v. Blake, 18 CC(NS) 466, 33 CD 163 [affirmed, without opinion, sub nomine, Blake v. Frerick, 88 OS 544].

 

56. (1911) This section was enacted soon after the decision in Hayes v. Smith, 62 OS 161, 56 NE 879, in order to change the rule laid down in that case to the effect that defendant's knowledge of the vicious propensities of a dog and his negligent keeping of such dog thereafter was the gist of the action: Frerich v. Blake, 18 CC(NS) 466, 33 CD 163 [affirmed, without opinion, sub nomine, Blake v. Frerick, 88 OS 544].

 

56.1 (1994) Civil trespass by the injured party is an exception to strict liability under RC §  955.28: Burden v. Dunlap, No. 1-94-14 (3rd Dist.), 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2551.

 

57. (1992) Civil trespass as well as criminal trespass remain valid defenses to strict liability for injury or loss caused by a dog pursuant to RC §  955.28(B): Buttermore v. Thompson, No. CA-8754 (5th Dist.), 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3246.

 

58. (1992) Liability as a harborer of a dog under RC §  955.28 is not defeated merely by virtue of the status as landlord but is determined by whether the landlord permitted the tenant's dog to be kept in common areas: Godsey v. Franz, No. 91WM000008 (6th Dist.), 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1087.

 

58.1 (2001) Liability under RC §  955.28 applies only to an owner, a keeper or a harborer of the dog. The statute does not provide for vicarious liability: Croley v. Moon Ent., Inc., 118 OMisc2d 151, 2001-Ohio-4366, 770 NE2d 148 (CP).

 

58.2 (2001) Punitive damages are appropriate in a dog bite case where the owners know that the dog has previously attacked others: Volz v. Hudson, 115 OMisc2d 63, 761 NE2d 711 (MC).

 

59. (1995) As a matter of law, a child under the age of three cannot be found to have teased, tormented or abused a dog: Meier v. Morrison, 72 OMisc2d 16, 655 NE2d 451 (CP).

 

60. (1995) If a parent's negligent supervision of a child contributed to the child's being bitten by another's dog, the parent may be liable for contribution in an action under RC §  955.28: Meier v. Morrison, 72 OMisc2d 12, 655 NE2d 449 (CP).

 

61. (1989) There are three elements which must be proven to hold a person strictly liable under RC §  955.28: (1) the defendant is the owner or keeper of the dog; (2) the dog in question is the proximate cause of plaintiff's damage; and (3) the monetary amount of the damages. In proving proximate cause, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that defendant's dog was more than a passive instrumentality in a claim of events leading to injury, i.e., a defendant cannot be automatically penalized for mere dog ownership: Smith v. Jett Hill Farm, Inc., 61 OMisc2d 338, 579 NE2d 295 (CP).

 

62. (1986) Where a household employee of a complying employer, while acting in the scope of and in the course of her employment, receives instructions from her employer as to her duties in attaching the household dog to a runner chain, and is bitten by that dog, the incident and her resultant injury have occurred in the scope of and in the course of her employment, and her complying employer shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for such injuries: Rowe v. Riess, 30 OMisc2d 28, 30 OBR 292, 506 NE2d 1237 (CP).

 

63. (1945) A person who is in possession and control of the premises where the dog lives, and silently acquiesces in the dog being kept there by the owner, can be held liable as a "harborer" of the dog: Sengel v. Maddox, 31 OO 201 (CP).

 

64. (1940) An action for injuries caused by a vicious dog may be brought against the owner or harborer of the dog either under the common law theory or under this section: Knoblauch v. Coufal, 18 OO 35 (MC).

 

65. (1940) The owner of a dog is liable for injuries sustained by one who goes upon the owner's premises to rescue an injured child and escape from further attacks by the dog: Knoblauch v. Coufal, 18 OO 35 (MC).

 

66. (1940) The elements necessary to establish liability are the ownership of the dog and the injury sustained because of the dog: Knoblauch v. Coufal, 18 OO 35 (MC).

 

67. (1933) General Code §  5652-14a (RC §  955.22) in no way relaxes the rule of absolute liability established by this section: Bohne v. Clerke, 32 NP(NS) 395.

 

68. (1933) Liability of an owner for injuries inflicted by his dog is established by proof of ownership, together with the fact that the injuries complained of were inflicted by that particular dog: Bohne v. Clerke, 32 NP(NS) 395.

 

69. (1933) The liability imposed by this section upon an owner for injuries inflicted by his dog, is in no sense dependent upon negligence, and a refusal of the court to charge upon the subject of negligence and ordinary care is not error: Bohne v. Clerke, 32 NP(NS) 395.

 

70. (1903) The provisions of this section do not apply to cases where a person wilfully tortures a dog or unnecessarily abuses it: Mick v. State, 8 NP(NS) 54, 19 OD 489.

 

71. (1931) Township trustees may not sue the owner of a dog for damages to horses, sheep, cattle, swine, mules or goats caused by such dog when the dog was registered and was destroyed within forty-eight hours after discovery that the loss was so caused: 1931 OAG No. 3713.


 

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