Illinois Dog Bite Law

CHAPTER 510.  ANIMALS

ANIMAL CONTROL ACT

510 ILCS 5/15  (2003)

[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 365]

§  510 ILCS 5/15.  [Vicious and dangerous dogs and other animals]

   Sec. 15. (a) For purposes of this Section:

(1) "Vicious dog" means:

   (i) Any individual dog that when unprovoked inflicts bites or attacks a human being or other animal either on public or private property.

   (ii) Any individual dog with a known propensity, tendency or disposition to attack without provocation, to cause injury or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals.

   (iii) Any individual dog that has as a trait or characteristic and a generally known reputation for viciousness, dangerousness or unprovoked attacks upon human beings or other animals, unless handled in a particular manner or with special equipment.

   (iv) Any individual dog which attacks a human being or domestic animal without provocation.

   (v) Any individual dog which has been found to be a "dangerous dog" upon 3 separate occasions.

 No dog shall be deemed "vicious" if it bites, attacks, or menaces a trespasser on the property of its owner or harms or menaces anyone who has tormented or abused it or is a professionally trained dog for law enforcement or guard duties. Vicious dogs shall not be classified in a manner that is specific as to breed.

 If a dog is found to be a vicious dog, the dog shall be subject to enclosure.

(2) "Dangerous Dog" means any individual dog which when either unmuzzled, unleashed, or unattended by its owner, or a member of its owner's family, in a vicious or terrorizing manner, approaches any person in an apparent attitude of attack upon streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds or places.

(3) "Enclosure" means a fence or structure of at least 6 feet in height, forming or causing an enclosure suitable to prevent the entry of young children, and suitable to confine a vicious dog in conjunction with other measures which may be taken by the owner or keeper, such as tethering of a vicious dog within the enclosure. Such enclosure shall be securely enclosed and locked and designed with secure sides, top and bottom and shall be designed to prevent the animal from escaping from the enclosure.

(4) "Impounded" means taken into the custody of the public pound in the city or town where the vicious dog is found.

(5) "Found to be vicious dog" means (i) that the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or a law enforcement officer has conducted an investigation and made a finding in writing that the dog is a vicious dog as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and, based on that finding, the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the Director has declared in writing that the dog is a vicious dog or (ii) that the circuit court has found the dog to be a vicious dog as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and has entered an order based on that finding.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to keep or maintain any dog which has been found to be a vicious dog unless such dog is at all times kept in an enclosure. The only times that a vicious dog may be allowed out of the enclosure are (1) if it is necessary for the owner or keeper to obtain veterinary care for the dog or (2) to comply with the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, provided that the dog is securely muzzled and restrained with a chain having a tensile strength of 300 pounds and not exceeding 3 feet in length, and shall be under the direct control and supervision of the owner or keeper of the dog.

 Any dog which has been found to be a vicious dog and which is not confined to an enclosure shall be impounded by the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the law enforcement authority having jurisdiction in such area and shall be turned over to a licensed veterinarian for destruction by lethal injection.

 If the owner of the dog has not appealed the impoundment order to the circuit court in the county in which the animal was impounded within 7 working days, the dog may be humanely dispatched. A dog found to be a vicious dog shall not be released to the owner until the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the Director approves the enclosure as defined in this Section.

 No owner or keeper of a vicious dog shall sell or give away the dog.

(c) It is unlawful for any person to maintain a public nuisance by permitting any dangerous dog or other animal to leave the premises of its owner when not under control by leash or other recognized control methods.

 Guide dogs for the blind or hearing impaired, support dogs for the physically handicapped, and sentry, guard, or police-owned dogs are exempt from this Section; provided, an attack or injury to a person occurs while the dog is performing duties as expected. To qualify for exemption under this Section, each such dog shall be currently inoculated against rabies in accordance with Section 8 of this Act [510 ILCS 5/8]. It shall be the duty of the owner of such exempted dog to notify the Administrator of changes of address. In the case of a sentry or guard dog, the owner shall keep the Administrator advised of the location where such dog will be stationed. The Administrator shall provide police and fire departments with a categorized list of such exempted dogs, and shall promptly notify such departments of any address changes reported to him.

 The Administrator, the State's Attorney, or any citizen of the county in which a dangerous dog or other animal exists may file a complaint in the name of the People of the State of Illinois to enjoin all persons from maintaining or permitting such, to abate the same, and to enjoin the owner of such dog or other animal from permitting same to leave his premises when not under control by leash or other recognized control methods. Upon the filing of a complaint in the circuit court, the court, if satisfied that this nuisance may exist, shall grant a preliminary injunction with bond in such amount as the court may determine enjoining the defendant from maintaining such nuisance. If the existence of the nuisance is established, the owner of such dog or other animal shall be in violation of this Act, and in addition, the court shall enter an order restraining the owner from maintaining such nuisance and may order that such dog or other animal be humanely dispatched. 

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 86-1460; 87-456. 

NOTES:

NOTE.

   This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 365.

ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.

   See 8 Illinois Administrative Code, §  30.140. 

CASE NOTES

LACK OF PROVOCATION

--INFERENCE

   The lack of provocation by another animal can be inferred where that animal is confined in its own pen and it is clear it did not attack. Logan County Animal Control Warden v. Danley, 211 Ill. App. 3d 198, 155 Ill. Dec. 615, 569 N.E.2d 1226 (4 Dist. 1991). 

 OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

"ATTACK"

   The word "attack", as used in the Animal Control Act, is not limited to actual physical contact, but also encompasses aggressive, threatening, or menacing behavior that does not culminate in biting or other injury. 2002 Op. Atty. Gen (02-001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

   Keeping of domestic animal as constituting public or private nuisance. 90 ALR5th 619.

510 ILCS 5/16  (2003)

[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 366]

§  510 ILCS 5/16.  [Attack or injury by animal; liability of owner]

   Sec. 16.  If a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in damages to such person for the full amount of the injury sustained. 

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 78-795. 

NOTES:

NOTE.

   This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 366.

CASE NOTES

ANALYSIS

Applicability

Assumption of Risk

--Applicability

--Available Defense

--Not Shown

--Shown

Attacks or Injures

--Disjunctive

--Predictable Behavior

Burden of Proof

--Reduction

Cause of Action

Common Law Action

--Not Precluded

--Pleading

Contributory Negligence

--Jury Instruction

Control of Animal

--Right of Recovery

Coverage

--Scope

Damages

--New Trial

--Not Excessive

Effect of Amendment

--On Other Statutes

--On Scope of Section

Elements of Cause of Action

Horse Rental

Jury Instructions

Lawful Presence

--Improper Warning

--Licensee

--Parents' Home

Legislative Intent

--Creation of Liabilities

--Inquiry

--Reasonable Interpretation

Liability

--Noncustodial Parent

--Not Absolute

--Not Shown

--Not Strict

--Of Keeper

--Running Dog

--Shown

Meritorious Defense

Negligence

--Not Necessary

Ownership

--Dogsitter

--Facts and Circumstances

--Harboring

--Not Shown

--Question of Fact

--Shown

Pleadings

Proportionality

--Illustrative Cases

Provocation

--In General

--Intent Immaterial

--Kicking and Pushing

--Not Shown

--Presence

--Relevant Evidence

--Scream

--Shown

--Source Immaterial

--Unintentional Acts

--Use of Dog Repellant

--Wilfulness Irrelevant

--Young Child

Purpose

Scope of Protection

Standing

--Parents of Minor

--Right to Recovery

APPLICABILITY

   The Animal Control Act, 510 ILCS 5/1 et seq., did not cease to apply to equine injury cases after the enactment of the Equine Liability Act, 745 ILCS 47/1 et seq. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).

ASSUMPTION OF RISK

--APPLICABILITY

   A plaintiff who assumes the risk of injury is not protected by this Act. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

   Where plaintiff, an admitted experienced cattleman, volunteered to assist with the movement of cattle, and the defendant knew plaintiff had experience with cattle and could reasonably assume that plaintiff was aware of their normal propensities and could or would take reasonable measures to protect himself, the common law defense of assumption of the risk was available even though the action was brought under this Act. Malott v. Hart, 167 Ill. App. 3d 209, 118 Ill. Dec. 69, 521 N.E.2d 137 (3 Dist. 1988).

   The defense of assumption of the risk can be applied under this section. Clark v. Rogers, 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 92 Ill. Dec. 136, 484 N.E.2d 867 (4 Dist. 1985).

--AVAILABLE DEFENSE

   Proof of assumption of risk is not precluded as a defense to an action brought under this section. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).

--NOT SHOWN

   The plaintiff was not barred from recovery for her injuries by the doctrine of assumption of risk where she was injured while riding her horse when a horse ridden by another person kicked her and her horse while the plaintiff and the other rider were talking after meeting on a trail. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).

   Where the defendants failed to present any evidence that the plaintiff expressly relieved them from any liability for injuries inflicted by their dog, and in the absence of evidence of a contractual or employment relationship between the parties, the doctrine of assumption of risk was inapplicable. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).

--SHOWN

   Where defendant voluntarily accepted responsibility for controlling defendant's dog, placing herself within the definition of an owner, the trial court correctly ruled that she could not recover from the dog's legal owner for injuries which resulted from her own failure to control the dog. Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill. App. 3d 541, 124 Ill. Dec. 213, 528 N.E.2d 1104 (3 Dist. 1988).

   Where plaintiff, a trained horsewoman, knew there were mares in the vicinity when she tried to mount a stallion, knew a stallion could become excited and uncontrollable around mares, but attempted to mount the stallion anyway, and where plaintiff accepted employment as a trainer of stallions knowing such horses were likely to buck or jump, the plaintiff assumed the risk of a fall from the stallion. Clark v. Rogers, 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 92 Ill. Dec. 136, 484 N.E.2d 867 (4 Dist. 1985).

   Where a plaintiff admitted that he had voluntarily entered into a contract with the defendant to shoe the defendant's horse and by his own admissions it was known to him and known within his profession that horses will sometimes kick while being shod, plaintiff, as a matter of law, assumed the risk of injury. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).

ATTACKS OR INJURES

--DISJUNCTIVE

   The statutory words "attacks or injures" are disjunctive and allow the plaintiff to recover if the animal injured plaintiff but did not attack. King v. Ohren, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 145 Ill. Dec. 138, 556 N.E.2d 756 (1 Dist. 1990).

--PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR

   An animal is a passive causal force and cannot be a proximate cause of injuries if it stands still or moves away from a plaintiff in a usual, predictable manner known to the plaintiff. King v. Ohren, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 145 Ill. Dec. 138, 556 N.E.2d 756 (1 Dist. 1990).

BURDEN OF PROOF

--REDUCTION

   This section reduces the burden upon a plaintiff by eliminating the common-law requirement that an injured person prove and plead that an animal owner knew or should have known of his animal's propensity to injure or attack people. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).

   The purpose of this section was to reduce the burden on plaintiffs by eliminating the common-law requirement that a plaintiff must plead and prove that an animal owner either knew or should have known that the animal had a propensity to injure people. Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988).

CAUSE OF ACTION

   A cause of action under this section can exist when an attack or an injury occurs. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

COMMON LAW ACTION

--NOT PRECLUDED

   A defendant landowner who was not the "owner" of the dog could nevertheless be found liable under the common law if she were aware of the dog's viciousness. Severson v. Ring, 244 Ill. App. 3d 453, 185 Ill. Dec. 706, 615 N.E.2d 1 (3 Dist. 1993).

   This section did not repeal the common law action for recovery as the result of a dog bite. Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Eckles, 77 Ill. App. 2d 408, 222 N.E.2d 530 (2 Dist. 1966).

--PLEADING

   Where plaintiff's complaint specifically alleged only a common law theory of recovery rather than recovery under this section, and failed to allege the two common law elements of mischievous propensity and notice, this omission did not render the complaint defective under F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), with its more relaxed pleading requirements than Illinois' fact-pleading rules, in a diversity action; although the elements of a claim under this section could be inferred from the complaint, filing a new complaint was ordered to allow the issues to be presented more clearly. Ross v. Ross, 104 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Ill. 1984).

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

--JURY INSTRUCTION

   While instructions regarding the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence should not have been given in a case brought under a prior similar provision which made it unnecessary to prove negligence in order to recover damages, the instructions were not so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal of judgment in favor of plaintiff, especially since the evidence amply supported the verdict. Beckert v. Risberg, 33 Ill. 2d 44, 210 N.E.2d 207 (1965).

CONTROL OF ANIMAL

--RIGHT OF RECOVERY

   There is no legal or policy justification for extending the protections of this Act to a rider of a horse; once the rider mounts the horse, the rider is no longer a bystander or observer, but is someone who has asserted dominion over the animal and is an active partner with the animal in recreational activity, and the rider assumes control and responsibility for the horse. While a cause of action may be stated under other theories of liability, there is none under this Act. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

   Where a person accepts responsibility for controlling an animal, he or she cannot recover for injuries sustained when he or she fails to control the animal. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

   Where a person accepts responsibility for controlling an animal, she cannot maintain a cause of action for injuries resulting from her own failure to control the animal. Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill. App. 3d 541, 124 Ill. Dec. 213, 528 N.E.2d 1104 (3 Dist. 1988); Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

COVERAGE

--SCOPE

   Coverage under this statute was intended for plaintiffs who, by virtue of their relationship to the owner of the dog or other animal or the lack of any such relationship, may not have any way of knowing or avoiding the risk that the animal posed to them. Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (3 Dist. 1988).

DAMAGES

--NEW TRIAL

   Plaintiff was properly awarded a new trial on the issues of damages alone where a jury verdict on the question of liability was adequately supported by the evidence under this section, and the questions of damages and liability were so separate and distinct that a trial limited to the question of damages would not have been unfair to the defendant. Barr v. Groll, 208 Ill. App. 3d 318, 153 Ill. Dec. 298, 567 N.E.2d 13 (5 Dist. 1991).

--NOT EXCESSIVE

   Where the jury verdict was five times the amount of out-of-pocket expenses, the verdict did not provide grounds for reversal. Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Eckles, 108 Ill. App. 2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 125 (2 Dist. 1969).

EFFECT OF AMENDMENT

--ON OTHER STATUTES

   Amendment adding "other animals" to this section was not intended to result in a revocation by implication of the Domestic Animals Running at Large Act (510 ILCS 55/1 et seq.). McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978).

--ON SCOPE OF SECTION

   The legislature, by amending this statute to encompass "other animals" besides dogs, did not intend to change the scope and general applicability of the statute to envelop a situation where domestic animals, such as horses, were running at large. McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978).

ELEMENTS OF CAUSE OF ACTION

   The four elements that must be proved to establish a cause of action are (1) injury caused by an animal owned by the defendants; (2) lack of provocation; (3) peaceable conduct of the injured person; and (4) the presence of the injured person in a place where he has a legal right to be. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976); McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978); Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988); Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989); Moore v. Roberts, 193 Ill. App. 3d 541, 140 Ill. Dec. 405, 549 N.E.2d 1277 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 546, 144 Ill. Dec. 259, 555 N.E.2d 378 (1990); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Pitchford, 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 161 Ill. Dec. 767, 579 N.E.2d 24 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 142 Ill. 2d 665, 164 Ill. Dec. 928, 584 N.E.2d 140 (1991).

   Duty is not an element of a cause of action against an owner under this section, nor is it necessary to prove negligence on the part of the owner. Kirchgessner v. County of Tazewell, 162 Ill. App. 3d 510, 114 Ill. Dec. 224, 516 N.E.2d 379 (3 Dist. 1987).

   In order for the plaintiff to recover under this section, he is required to prove: an attack by a dog; that the defendant is the owner of the dog; injury to the plaintiff; absence of provocation by the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff was conducting himself peaceably in a place where he had a legal right to be. Steinberg ex rel. Martinez v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 94 Ill. Dec. 187, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1 Dist. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 114 Ill. 2d 496, 103 Ill. Dec. 725, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).

HORSE RENTAL

   No claim exists under the act when a rider is thrown from a horse she has voluntarily mounted. Swierkosz v. Starved Rock Stables, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 180 Ill. Dec. 386, 607 N.E.2d 280 (3 Dist. 1993).

   Where a person rents a horse and understands and expressly accepts the risks of using the horse, he cannot recover damages under this section from the person who rented the horse to him. Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (3 Dist. 1988).

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

   In an action arising from an attack of the plaintiff by the defendants' dog, the court properly refused to use Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 111.04 (3d ed. 1995) because that instruction inaccurately states the law with regard to provocation by taking the view of the reasonable person, rather that the view of a reasonable dog. Kirkham v. Will, 311 Ill. App. 3d 787, 244 Ill. Dec. 174, 724 N.E.2d 1062 (5 Dist. 2000).

LAWFUL PRESENCE

   Violation of traffic laws by injured plaintiffs who were illegally riding an all-terrain vehicle on a public highway when they were injured by colliding with the defendant's dog did not necessarily preclude them from recovering under the statute; their activity was peaceable, though illegal, and they were in a place where they had a right to be, although they should not have been riding an all-terrain vehicle there. Garcia v. Nelson, 326 Ill. App. 3d 33, 259 Ill. Dec. 821, 759 N.E.2d 601 (2 Dist. 2001), appeal denied, 198 Ill. 2d 614, 264 Ill. Dec. 324, 770 N.E.2d 218 (2002).

--IMPROPER WARNING

   Where in the defendants' building, no notices indicated that any part of the premises was used as a private residence, it was clear that when the plaintiff entered the building, crossed its lobby, entered the elevator and rode it to the fifth floor, the plaintiff was lawfully on the premises, she was also lawfully on the premises when she entered the fifth floor hall were she was attacked, since persons entering the building and riding its elevator would have no reason to believe that the fifth floor was used for residential purposes or that vicious dogs were kept there, where the sole warning to this effect was posted in a place where it could be seen only split seconds before one would enter the danger area, under these circumstances, the warning sign was in the wrong location, it did not give adequate warning of the danger, and gave no grounds for holding that persons who entered the hall had no legal right to be there. Messa v. Sullivan, 61 Ill. App. 2d 386, 209 N.E.2d 872 (1 Dist. 1965).

--LICENSEE

   Plaintiff was a licensee on defendant's land when he was bitten by defendant's dog; therefore, he was in a place where he could lawfully be within the meaning of a prior similar provision. Dobrin ex rel. Dobrin v. Stebbins, 122 Ill. App. 2d 387, 259 N.E.2d 405 (1 Dist 1970).

--PARENTS' HOME

   The plaintiff was lawfully on the premises at the time the defendants' dog attacked her, where the plaintiff, although an adult who resided elsewhere, was in the habit of visiting the defendants, her parents, on a regular basis and possessed a key to the defendants' home, and where such possession was of a long-standing nature. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

--CREATION OF LIABILITIES

   The legislature intended to create two liabilities on the part of the owner of a dog, one if the animal injured a person who was peaceably conducting himself in a place he could lawfully be, or one if the animal attacked a person under such circumstances. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

--INQUIRY

   Under this Act, the legislature did not intend to eliminate inquiry into whether an animal might be diseased, whether a dangerous propensity was undisclosed, whether a horse was properly saddled, or whether there was any attempt to match the rider with the horse. Harris v. Walker, 152 Ill. App. 3d 384, 105 Ill. Dec. 426, 504 N.E.2d 526 (3 Dist. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (1988).

--REASONABLE INTERPRETATION

   Where literal enforcement of this Act would result in great injustice which was not contemplated, the court will construe this Act to give effect to what must have been reasonably intended by the legislature. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).

LIABILITY

   Where the injuries were caused by the animal's behavior other than an attack on the victim, proximate cause between the animal's behavior and the injury to the minor victim must be established. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

--NONCUSTODIAL PARENT

   This Act contemplates some level of care, control, or custody, in order for a noncustodial parent to be held liable for the injuries caused by her son's dog. Papesh v. Matesevac, 223 Ill. App. 3d 189, 165 Ill. Dec. 370, 584 N.E.2d 549 (3 Dist. 1991).

--NOT ABSOLUTE

   While a plaintiff need not prove a defendant's negligence under this Act, the statute does not impose absolute liability on animal owners. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).

   Under this Act, liability is not absolute (i.e., not strict liability) but qualified. Harris v. Walker, 152 Ill. App. 3d 384, 105 Ill. Dec. 426, 504 N.E.2d 526 (3 Dist. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (1988).

--NOT SHOWN

   Where dog was in defendants' home, behind a locked gate, and defendants stated the dog could not get out, and it was impossible for the dog to attack or injure plaintiff, there was no factual or reasonable basis for imposing liability under this section for fall suffered by plaintiff while visiting in defendants' home, allegedly occasioned by becoming frightened on hearing the dog growl. Partipilo v. Dimaria, 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 156 Ill. Dec. 207, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1 Dist. 1991).

   Where the plaintiff fell from the porch as a result of tripping over a dog who was lying in her path as she sought to exit from the house, owner of the dog was not liable for plaintiff's injuries under a prior similar provision because there was no overt act, vicious or otherwise, attributable to the dog that caused the injury to the plaintiff. Bailey v. Bly, 87 Ill. App. 2d 259, 231 N.E.2d 8 (4 Dist. 1967).

   Evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant was not guilty in a suit for damages for personal injuries brought under former similar provision. Garbell v. Fields, 36 Ill. App. 2d 399, 184 N.E.2d 750 (1 Dist. 1962).

--NOT STRICT

   While the language of this section appears to be absolute, it does not impose strict liability on animal owners. Partipilo v. Dimaria, 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 156 Ill. Dec. 207, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1 Dist. 1991).

--OF KEEPER

   The keeper of an animal, as well as its owner, can be held liable under this Act; a keeper of an animal has been defined in terms of management, custody, care or control. Kirchgessner v. County of Tazewell, 162 Ill. App. 3d 510, 114 Ill. Dec. 224, 516 N.E.2d 379 (3 Dist. 1987).

--RUNNING DOG

   Where it was established that the act of a dog running between plaintiff's legs was the cause of her falling, evidence was sufficient to sustain liability under a prior similar provision upon the dog's owner. McEvoy v. Brown,