Dog Bite Law Center: Georgia Dog Bite Law

Georgia Dog Bite Law

TITLE 51. TORTS

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CHAPTER 2. IMPUTABLE NEGLIGENCE

O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 (2002)

§ 51-2-7. Liability of owner or keeper of vicious or dangerous animal for injuries caused by animal

A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so injured. In proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated government, and the said animal was at the time of the occurrence not at heel or on a leash. The foregoing sentence shall not apply to domesticated fowl including roosters with spurs. The foregoing sentence shall not apply to domesticated livestock.

HISTORY: Orig. Code 1863, § 2907; Code 1868, § 2913; Code 1873, § 2964; Code 1882, § 2964; Civil Code 1895, § 3821; Civil Code 1910, § 4417; Code 1933, § 105-110; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1033, § 1.

NOTES:

HISTORY OF SECTION. --The language of this section is derived in part from the decision in Conway v. Grant, 88 Ga. 40, 13 S.E. 803 (1891).

CROSS REFERENCES. --Care, confinement, etc., of wild animals, Ch. 5, T. 27.

LAW REVIEWS. --For annual survey article on tort law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 421 (2000).

For note, "Is There (and Should There Be) Any "Bite' Left in Georgia's "First Bite' Rule?" see 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1343 (2000).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

Knowledge

Violation of Ordinances

Domesticated Livestock

Procedure

GENERAL CONSIDERATION

THIS SECTION IS BUT A RESTATEMENT OF COMMON LAW. Rodriguez v. Newby, 131 Ga. App. 651, 206 S.E.2d 585 (1974).

The 1985 amendment of this section, substituting "may" for "shall" in the first sentence, brought the amount of statutory liability more in line with the liability imposed by the common law, since it did not purport to change the "first bite" rule, but rather supported the limited protection of the rule for pet owners by removing an inflexible strict liability standard. Hamilton v. Walker, 235 Ga. App. 635, 510 S.E.2d 120 (1998).

SECTION IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE BASIS FOR RECOVERY WHEN INJURY IS CAUSED BY DOMESTIC ANIMAL. Callaway v. Miller, 118 Ga. App. 309, 163 S.E.2d 336 (1968).

CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ATTACK BY ANIMAL. --The owner of a vicious or dangerous animal, who allows the same to go at liberty, is liable to one who sustains injury as a result of the vicious or dangerous tendency of the animal only in the event that the owner knows of its vicious or dangerous character. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968); Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978).

Under this section, which is but a restatement of the common law, to support an action for damages for injuries sustained by being bitten by a dog, it is necessary to show that the dog was vicious, and that the owner had knowledge of this fact. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944); McCree v. Burks, 129 Ga. App. 678, 200 S.E.2d 491 (1973).

An owner of a domestic animal who allows it to go at liberty is liable under this section to one who sustains injury as a result of the vicious or dangerous tendency of the animal only in the event the owner knows of its vicious or dangerous character. Starling v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 428, 174 S.E.2d 214 (1970).

In order for a party to recover, it must appear that the animal had a propensity to do the act which caused the injury and that the defendant knew of it. McCree v. Burks, 129 Ga. App. 678, 200 S.E.2d 491 (1973); Pearce v. Shanks, 153 Ga. App. 693, 266 S.E.2d 353 (1980).

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CAT AND DOG BITE CASES TREATED SAME. --There is no authority for the assertion that cat bite cases should be treated differently than dog bite cases. Fellers v. Carson, 182 Ga. App. 658, 356 S.E.2d 658, cert. denied, 182 Ga. App. 910, 356 S.E.2d 658 (1987).

CITED in Phillips v. Cleveland, 31 Ga. App. 206, 120 S.E. 639 (1923); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 30 S.E.2d 398 (1944); Rutherford v. Underwood, 84 Ga. App. 624, 66 S.E.2d 768 (1951); Thomas v. Richardson, 129 Ga. App. 834, 201 S.E.2d 653 (1973); Gordon v. Dawson, 146 Ga. App. 784, 247 S.E.2d 596 (1978); Rines v. Harris, 18 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); Smith v. Culver, 172 Ga. App. 183, 322 S.E.2d 294 (1984); McBride v. Wasik, 179 Ga. App. 244, 345 S.E.2d 921 (1986); Goodman v. Kahn, 182 Ga. App. 724, 356 S.E.2d 757 (1987); Gilbert v. Hudspeth, 182 Ga. App. 898, 357 S.E.2d 601 (1987); Pickard v. Cook, 223 Ga. App. 595, 478 S.E.2d 432 (1996); Bakhtiarnejad v. Cox Enters., Inc., 247 Ga. App. 205, 541 S.E.2d 33 (2000).

KNOWLEDGE

DOG'S DANGEROUS CHARACTER AND OWNER'S KNOWLEDGE THEREOF. --Under this section the dog's dangerous character is at issue totally apart from the issue of the owner's knowledge of his dangerous character, therefore, while the expert's report concluding that the dog was dangerous or potentially dangerous could not be relevant to the issue of knowledge because it was issued after the attack on the plaintiff, the fact that the dog was declared dangerous or potentially dangerous three weeks after the attack were relevant to whether the dog had dangerous propensities at the time of the attack. Torrance v. Brennan, 209 Ga. App. 65, 432 S.E.2d 658 (1993).

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF VICIOUS AND DANGEROUS CHARACTER. --If owner does not know of vicious and dangerous character of his animal, he will not be liable for injury which is not usual and natural consequence to be anticipated from allowing an ordinary animal of that kind to go at large. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968).

UNFORESEEN AND UNFORESEEABLE ACTS OF DOG. --Owner of dog may not be found liable for unforeseen and unforeseeable act of dog simply because dog was not under owner's direct control at the time the act took place. Fitzpatrick v. Henley, 154 Ga. App. 555, 269 S.E.2d 60 (1980).

PROOF OF SCIENTER REQUIRED. --Under this section, it is still necessary, as at common law, to show not only that the animal is vicious or dangerous, but also that the owner or keeper knows of this fact. Harvey v. Buchanan, 121 Ga. 384, 49 S.E. 281 (1904).

Scienter is a necessary and a material fact which must be shown before there can be any finding of liability under this section. Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 167 S.E.2d 697 (1969); McCree v. Burks, 129 Ga. App. 678, 200 S.E.2d 491 (1973); Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

Proof of scienter is essential to a suit under this section. Johnson v. Hurt, 120 Ga. App. 761, 172 S.E.2d 201 (1969).

Proof that the owner of a dog either knew or should have known of the dog's propensity to do the particular act which caused injury to the complaining party is indispensable to recovery against the owner. Fitzpatrick v. Henley, 154 Ga. App. 555, 269 S.E.2d 60 (1980); Stanger v. Cato, 182 Ga. App. 498, 356 S.E.2d 97 (1987).

The size of a dog, its breed, and the fact that its owner keeps it restrained, does not establish any inference that the owner knows the dog to be dangerous. Freeman v. Farr, 184 Ga. App. 830, 363 S.E.2d 48 (1987).

SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IS NOT SATISFIED BY DOG OWNER'S USE OF A RESTRAINING CHAIN, OR POSTING OF "BEWARE OF DOG" SIGN. Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

CHAIN RESTRAINT MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT. --The simple fact that a dog is restrained on a chain may not be sufficient to establish the owner is free from liability for "careless management" under this section. Freeman v. Farr, 184 Ga. App. 830, 363 S.E.2d 48 (1987).

OWNER IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTS OF DOG IF THERE IS LACK OF SCIENTER. Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

Where there is a lack of scienter even the breach of a leash law is not sufficient to hold the owner responsible for the acts of the dog. Turner v. Irvin, 146 Ga. App. 218, 246 S.E.2d 127 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Henley, 154 Ga. App. 555, 269 S.E.2d 60 (1980).

KNOWLEDGE OF PROPENSITY TO PARTICULAR HARM REQUIRED. --It is not enough for liability under this section that the possessor of the animal know of a propensity to do harm in one or more specific ways; it is necessary that he have reason to know of its propensity to do harm of the type which it inflicts, Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972); Penick v. Grimsley, 130 Ga. App. 722, 204 S.E.2d 510 (1974); Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978); Rowlette v. Paul, 219 Ga. App. 597, 466 S.E.2d 37 (1995); Clark v. Joiner, 242 Ga. App. 421, 530 S.E.2d 45 (2000).

KNOWLEDGE MAY BE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE. --To support a recovery a plaintiff must show either actual or constructive knowledge by the defendant of the animal's danger to others. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968); Starling v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 428, 174 S.E.2d 214 (1970).

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KNOWLEDGE PRESUMED IN CERTAIN CASES. --While this section does not set out how knowledge of the vicious nature of the animal may be acquired, under the common law this knowledge is presumed to exist when the animal involved belongs to a certain class of animals ferae naturae, such as lions, tigers, bears, wolves, baboons, apes, and monkeys, etc. Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935).

When a person is injured by an attack of an animal ferae naturae, the negligence of the owner or keeper thereof is presumed, because of the dangerous and ferocious propensities of a wild beast, such as a lion, tiger, leopard, bear, ape, baboon, and such wild beasts, and the law recognizes that safety lies only in keeping such animals perfectly secure. Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935).

A propensity on the part of a dog to bite people is not one of the instincts common to the species of which every owner must be presumed to have notice. Starling v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 428, 174 S.E.2d 214 (1970).

WHAT CONSTITUTES KNOWLEDGE OF ANIMAL'S DANGEROUS NATURE. --In order to constitute notice to an owner or keeper of an animal's vicious or dangerous nature, there should be an incident or incidents which would put a prudent man on notice to anticipate the event which occurred. A single incident may not adequately place a person on notice. The test should be whether the one incident was of such nature as to cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that the animal was sufficiently dangerous as to be likely to cause an injury at a later time. Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978).

If a dog has "friendly" intentions but has habits which because of its size or other characteristics make it dangerous, then it seems that such behavior should be controlled. However, it is necessary that the owner, as previously pointed out, have knowledge of the pattern of the animal's dangerous behavior before he can be held for failure to control the animal. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968).

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF DOG'S VICIOUS PROPENSITY. --By presenting evidence that defendant's animal was required to be on a leash by an ordinance of the applicable governmental body and that the animal was not on a leash at the time of the occurrence, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to prove the vicious propensity of defendant's dog under this Code section. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in defendant's favor based upon uncontroverted evidence that defendant had no knowledge of his dog's vicious propensity. Fields v. Thompson, 190 Ga. App. 177, 378 S.E.2d 390 (1989).

Defendant pet-owner's statement to another, about three months before defendant's dog bit plaintiff, asking that person "to do whatever was necessary . . . to keep the dogs from attacking. . ." raises genuine issues of material fact as to defendant's prior knowledge of the dogs' tendency to attack humans. Supan v. Griffin, 238 Ga. App. 404, 519 S.E.2d 22 (1999).

KNOWLEDGE OR NOTICE THAT DOG WILL BEHAVE FEROCIOUSLY TOWARD OTHER ANIMALS IS NOT NECESSARILY NOTICE THAT IT WILL ATTACK HUMAN BEINGS. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972); Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

Knowledge of attacks on other animals, combined with the confinement by defendant of his dog, is not sufficient to show defendant's knowledge of the dog's vicious tendencies and therefore to create liability under this section. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972).

DOG'S MENACING BEHAVIOR ALONE IS SUFFICIENT TO APPRISE ITS OWNER OF ANIMAL'S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES. Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

MENACING BEHAVIOR DOES NOT ESTABLISH VICIOUS PROPENSITY. --A dog's barking and growling amount, at most, to menacing behavior, and menacing behavior does not establish vicious propensity under this section. Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 507 S.E.2d 877 (1998).

KNOWLEDGE OF FROLICSOME AFFECTION DIRECTED SOLELY TO OWNERS. --An owner's knowledge of a dog's frolicsome affection which is directed solely towards the owners is not such knowledge of a pattern of dangerous behavior as to put a reasonably prudent person on notice that the animal may cause injury by displaying such behavior towards another at a later date. Marshall v. Person, 176 Ga. App. 542, 336 S.E.2d 380 (1985).

FACT THAT DOG OWNER INVITED OR ALLOWED NEIGHBOR TO PET HIS DOG did not make him liable for the neighbor's subsequent dog bite injuries, where the owner had no prior knowledge, either actual or constructive, that the dog would bite the neighbor. Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 507 S.E.2d 877 (1998).

ADEQUACY OF OWNER'S MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL. --A new trial was authorized where material fact issues existed as to the adequacy of an owner's management and control of her dog. Evans-Watson v. Reese, 188 Ga. App. 292, 372 S.E.2d 675 (1988).

Even if defendant's dog were vicious or dangerous, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendant was careless in his management of the dog and whether plaintiff exercised reasonable care for his own safety, where the dog was chained in an area accessible only by stepping over a 28" high guardrail and which was not an area where people would normally pass. Hackett v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 191 Ga. App. 442, 382 S.E.2d 180 (1989).

GUARD DOGS. --The scienter requirement applies in the case of a dog specifically purchased and used for guarding commercial property. Wade v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458, 540 S.E.2d 671 (2000).

VICTIM'S KNOWLEDGE OF DOG'S AGGRESSIVE TENDENCIES. --Trial court properly granted summary judgment to dog owners in dog bite case in light of the evidence of the victim's equal or superior knowledge of the dog's aggressive tendencies and assumption of the risk in petting the dog. Durham v. Mason, 256 Ga. App. 467, 568 S.E.2d 530 (2002).

VIOLATION OF ORDINANCES

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VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NOT NECESSARILY SCIENTER. --The fact that a mad dog is at large in violation of the municipal ordinance imposing a penalty upon its owner does not alter the rule that scienter must be shown. Langford v. Eskedor, 30 Ga. App. 799, 119 S.E. 431 (1923).

VIOLATION OF LOCAL ORDINANCE. --By presenting evidence that defendant's dog was required by ordinance to be on a leash and that the dog was not on a leash at the time of the occurrence, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to prove the vicious propensity of the dog under this section. Oertel v. Chi Psi Fraternity, 239 Ga. App. 147, 521 S.E.2d 71 (1999).

VIOLATION OF LEASH LAW WAS IRRELEVANT UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS. --In the absence of any evidence showing that the owners of a dog had knowledge, prior to a mauling incident, that their dog had ever bitten another human being, the owners of the dog were not liable to the victim even though the dog's presence on the premises where the incident occurred was in violation of the county leash law. Brown v. Pierce, 176 Ga. App. 787, 338 S.E.2d 39 (1985).

DOG NOT CONFINED AS REQUIRED BY ORDINANCE. --Defendants' dog was not "confined within the property limits of his owner or custodian," as required by a county ordinance, where, although the animal may have been physically within the boundaries of defendants' property at the time it bit plaintiffs' son, it had broken loose from its chain. Tutak v. Fairley, 198 Ga. App. 307, 401 S.E.2d 73 (1991).

When a dog's owner allowed the dog to run free inside his house, including having access to doors leading outside the house, a genuine fact issue was present as to whether the dog was allowed to roam free in violation of a local ordinance. Johnston v. Warendh, 252 Ga. App. 674, 556 S.E.2d 867 (2001).

DOMESTICATED LIVESTOCK

BULLS, STALLIONS, AND RAMS. --The law does not regard bulls, stallions, and rams as being abnormally dangerous animals, but rather as animals routinely kept for stud purposes, so that the particular danger involved in their dangerous tendencies has become a normal incident of civilized life. Taft v. Taft, 209 Ga. App. 499, 433 S.E.2d 667 (1993).

INJURIES BY RUNAWAY HORSE. --The owner of a runaway horse is generally liable for injuries caused by him. Phillips v. Dewald, 79 Ga. 732, 7 S.E. 151, 11 Am. St. R. 458 (1887).

KNOWLEDGE THAT HORSE HAS THROWN RIDER DOES NOT SHOW PROPENSITY TO KICK. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972).

PROCEDURE

SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADINGS. --It is not sufficient to allege that the defendant knew or should have known that his dog was vicious, but facts showing knowledge, either actual or constructive, must be alleged. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944).

Where plaintiff did not allege that dog had ever made an attack on anyone prior to the time it injured her, or had ever given defendant cause to suspect that it might be vicious, except that it belonged to the breed of dogs known as German police dogs, and did not allege that the defendant was the owner of the dog, or that she ever had the dog under her personal supervision or control, petition did not set out a cause of action for damages sustained by plaintiff when bitten by the dog. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944).

Petition alleged that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, and that she was bitten by dog on entering the premises, and that defendant did not furnish plaintiff with a safe place to work, in that keeping the dog endangered her life and safety while she was in the performance of duties incident to her employment. Where no facts were alleged to show that the defendant had knowledge that the dog was vicious, or that it would be unsafe for the plaintiff to work in the house with the dog present, the petition failed to set out a cause of action because of failure to allege facts showing the defendant knew, or should have known of the danger. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944).

Where in an action for damages it is alleged that the plaintiff was bitten and injured by a dog kept by the defendant, that the dog was vicious and accustomed to bite mankind which was known to the defendant, the allegations are sufficient as against a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Greene v. Orr, 75 Ga. App. 673, 44 S.E.2d 273 (1947).

Where a petition alleges that defendant wrongfully and injuriously did keep a certain dog which he knew was used and accustomed to attack and bite mankind, and that he negligently and carelessly managed said dog in that he permitted the dog to go at liberty knowing the character of said dog and that the dog was vicious and that the defendant knew that it was vicious, the ferocious character of the dog and knowledge of the owner were sufficiently alleged as against a demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Greene v. Orr, 75 Ga. App. 673, 44 S.E.2d 273 (1947).

KNOWLEDGE CAN DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT. --Affidavit by the mother of a dog-bite victim that the dog's owner told her that "she knew something like this would happen" was admissible, and was evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment for defendants. Johnson v. Kvasny, 230 Ga. App. 162, 495 S.E.2d 651 (1998).

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JURY INSTRUCTIONS. --Where there was proof going to show that the plaintiff, at the time she was injured by reason of the horse running over her, was standing upon a sidewalk in a city, and one of the acts of negligence charged by the petition was the alleged driving of the horse upon the sidewalk, in violation of a city ordinance, and such ordinance was admitted in evidence without objection, it was not error for the court to charge upon the validity and legal effect of the ordinance, even though the evidence indicated that the driving of the horse on the sidewalk was unintentional on the part of the driver, where the court expressly instructed the jury that, if such act was unintentional, it would constitute no violation of the ordinance. Clackum v. Bagwell, 40 Ga. App. 831, 151 S.E. 689 (1930).

JURY QUESTION. --In an action for injuries to the plaintiff by a bull of the defendant, the questions of the viciousness of the bull, and the negligence of the defendant are questions for the jury. Van Harlengen v. Bearse, 26 Ga. App. 473, 106 S.E. 306 (1921).

Where a private zoo owner opens his private zoo for viewing without any charge to the public, it is a question for the jury whether the act of the defendant's employee in removing a chimpanzee from its cage complied with that degree of care required by this section. Palmer Chem. & Equip. Co. v. Gantt, 123 Ga. App. 703, 182 S.E.2d 492 (1971).

While a previous attack would not necessarily be required to say there is a jury issue on the question of knowledge that a dog had a propensity to attack human beings, at least some form of menacing behavior would be. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972).

Evidence that the dog's owner knew that the dog had tried to attack another person and had scolded the dog for this behavior was behavior evidence such that the jury should have been allowed to determine whether the owner should have anticipated the subsequent successful attack on plaintiff. Thurmond v. Saffo, 238 Ga. App. 687, 520 S.E.2d 43 (1999).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SCOPE OF SECTION. --This section relates to a civil action for damages for injury caused by a vicious or dangerous animal kept by its owner where he with knowledge of the viciousness of the animal negligently allows the same to go at liberty. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 652.

BASIS OF LIABILITY. --If injury occurs to another by reason of the exercise of the vicious propensity of an animal, the owner will be held liable therefor, if he knew of the vicious character and negligently allowed such an animal to run at large. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 652.

PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE. --Where a person is injured by an attack of an animal which by nature is vicious, the negligence of the owner is presumed because the law recognizes that safety lies only in keeping such animals perfectly secure, 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 652.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

AM. JUR. 2D. --4 Am. Jur. 2d, Animals, § 91 et seq.

C.J.S. --3A C.J.S., Animals, § 177 et seq.

ALR. --Duty and liability of master to servant injured by horse belonging to master, 26 ALR 871; 42 ALR 226; 60 ALR 468.

Character and extent of claims for which lien on animal damage feasant attaches, 26 ALR 1047.

Constitutionality of "dog laws", 49 ALR 847.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injury to person thereon by dog not owned or harbored by former, 92 ALR 732.

Liability of owner of male animal who furnishes its service for breeding purposes, for damage inflicted during such services, 106 ALR 1418.

Owner or keeper of trespassing dog as subject to injunction or damages, 107 ALR 1323.

Owner's liability, under legislation forbidding domestic animals to run at large on highways, as dependent on negligence, 34 ALR2d 1285.

Statutory liability for physical injuries inflicted by animal as surviving defendant's death, 40 ALR2d 543.

Liability for injury to property inflicted by wild animal, 57 ALR2d 242.

Contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or intentional provocation as defense to action for injury by dog, 66 ALR2d 916.

Liability of landlord to tenant or member of tenant's family, for injury by animal or insect, 67 ALR2d 1005.

Law as to cats, 73 ALR2d 1032; 8 ALR4th 1287.

Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show, 80 ALR2d 886.

Liability of owner of horse to person injured or killed when kicked, bitten, knocked down, and the like, 85 ALR2d 1161.

Liability for injury or damage caused by bees, 86 ALR2d 791.

Master's liability to agricultural worker injured other than by farm machinery, 9 ALR3d 1061.

Liability for injury or death of child social guest, 20 ALR3d 1127.

Owner's or keeper's liability for personal injury or death inflicted by wild animal, 21 ALR3d 603; 92 ALR3d 832; 66 ALR Fed. 305.

Liability of owner of dog known by him to be vicious for injuries to trespasser, 64 ALR3d 1039.

Animals as attractive nuisance, 64 ALR3d 1069.

Keeping bees as nuisance, 88 ALR3d 992.

Governmental liability from operation of zoo, 92 ALR3d 832.

Personal injuries inflicted by animal as within homeowner's or personal liability policy, 96 ALR3d 891.

Liability of owner of dog for dog's biting veterinarian or veterinarian's employee, 4 ALR4th 349.

Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injuries by horse to hirer or bailee thereof, 6 ALR4th 358.

Measure, elements, and amount of damages for killing or injuring cat, 8 ALR4th 1287.

Liability of person, other than owner of animal or owner or operator of motor vehicle, for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway, 21 ALR4th 132.

Liability of owner or operator of vehicle for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therin resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in stree tor highway, 21 ALR4th 159.

Liability of owner of animal for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway, 29 ALR4th 431.

Liability to adult social guest injured otherwise than by condition of premises, 38 ALR4th 200.

Liability for personal injury or death caused by trespassing or intruding livestock, 49 ALR4th 710.

Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite, 51 ALR4th 446.

Cat as subject of larceny, 55 ALR4th 1080.

Who "harbors" or "keeps" dog under animal liability statute, 64 ALR4th 963.

Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat, 67 ALR4th 976.

Liability for injuries caused by cat, 68 ALR4th 823.

Landlord's liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 87 ALR4th 1004.

Landlord's liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 89 ALR4th 374.

Intentional provocation, contributory or comparative negligence, or assumption of risk as defense to action for injury by dog, 11 ALR5th 127.

Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show, 68 ALR5th 599.

Liability of United States, under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USCS secs. 1346, 2671 et seq.), for death or injury sustained by visitor to national park or national forest, 66 ALR Fed. 305.

USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this subpart, part, article, chapter or title.