§  11-1025. Liability for dog bites

 

   A. The owner of a dog which bites a person when the person is in or on a public place or lawfully in or on a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's knowledge of its viciousness.

B. Nothing in this section or in section 11-1020 shall permit the bringing of an action for damages against any governmental agency using a dog in military or police work if the bite occurred while the dog was defending itself from a harassing or provoking act, or assisting an employee of the agency in any of the following:

   1. In the apprehension or holding of a suspect where the employee has a reasonable suspicion of the suspect's involvement in criminal activity.

   2. In the investigation of a crime or possible crime.

   3. In the execution of a warrant.

   4. In the defense of a peace officer or another person.

C. Subsection B of this section shall not apply in any case where the victim of the bite was not a party to, nor a participant in, nor suspected to be a party to or a participant in, the act that prompted the use of the dog in the military or police work.

D. Subsection B of this section shall apply only where a governmental agency using a dog in military or police work has adopted a written policy on the necessary and appropriate use of a dog for the police or military work enumerated in subsection B of this section. 

 

HISTORY: Last year in which legislation affected this section: 1992

   

ANALYSIS

In General.

Construction.

Legislative Intent.

Common Law.

Defenses.

Duty of Care.

Family Members.

Limitations.

Stolen Dogs.

Strict Liability.

 

IN GENERAL.

   This section created a change in substantive law and was not simply a change in pleading and proof requirements. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

 

CONSTRUCTION.

   This section, being in derogation of the common law, is subject to strict, literal construction. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

   The legislative amendment to this section, enacted in 1992, which excepts the use of police dogs from strict liability under the dog bite statute, constitutes a change in the law that applies only prospectively. Weekly v. City of Mesa, 181 Ariz. 159, 888 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App. 1994).

 

LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

   The legislature use the conjunction "or" rather than "and," indicative of a legislative intent that either the owner or some other person responsible for a dog may be held liable for injury or damage caused by the dog. Johnson v. Svidergol, 157 Ariz. 333, 757 P.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988).

 

COMMON LAW.

   This section does not codify or replace common law liability. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

   It is possible to proceed simultaneously under this section and common law theories. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

   The cause of action created by this section is distinct from the common law which imposes liability on dog owners only if the owner knew or had reason to know of their animal's vicious propensities. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

   A claim pursuant to this section is legally distinct from a common law dog bite claim. Schleier ex rel. Alter v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 767 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1989).

 

DEFENSES.

   The only defense to liability under this section is proof that the injured party provoked the dog. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

 

DUTY OF CARE.

   The duty imposed upon dog owners by this section is not a familial duty confined to the care of one's own child, but rather a general duty to a large protected class. Schleier ex rel. Alter v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 767 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1989).

 

FAMILY MEMBERS.

   Arizona's strict liability dog bite statute did not apply when the victim was a child of and resides in the same household as the owners of the dog and was bitten at the family home. Schleier ex rel. Alter v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 767 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1989).

 

LIMITATIONS.

   A cause of action brought pursuant to §  24-521, Arizona's "dog bite statute," is governed by the time limitations contained in §  12-541, subsection 3. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

 

STOLEN DOGS.

   Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on liability against the owner of dog for injuries sustained by a dog bite victim after the dog had been stolen from the owner. Johnson v. Svidergol, 157 Ariz. 333, 757 P.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988).

 

STRICT LIABILITY.

   This section imposes strict liability on dog owners for injuries inflicted by their dog without respect to fault on the part of the owner. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

   In Arizona, dogs do not get one free bite"; owners are held strictly liable for injuries caused by their dogs' actions and liablity is imposed without regard to an owner's knowledge of the dog's viciousness. Massey v. Colaric, 151 Ariz. 65, 725 P.2d 1099 (1986).

TITLE 12.  COURTS AND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS

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CHAPTER 5.  LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS

 

ARTICLE 3.  PERSONAL ACTIONS

 

A.R.S. §  12-541  (2003)

 

§  12-541. Malicious prosecution; false imprisonment; libel or slander; seduction or breach of promise of marriage; breach of employment contract; wrongful termination; liability created by statute; one year limitation

 

   There shall be commenced and prosecuted within one year after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, the following actions:

   1. For malicious prosecution, or for false imprisonment, or for injuries done to the character or reputation of another by libel or slander.

   2. For damages for seduction or breach of promise of marriage.

   3. For breach of an oral or written employment contract including contract actions based on employee handbooks or policy manuals that do not specify a time period in which to bring an action.

   4. For damages for wrongful termination.

   5. Upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture. 

 

HISTORY: Last year in which legislation affected this section: 1996

   

ANALYSIS

Accrual of Action.

Liability Created by Statute.

Libel and Slander.

-- In General.

-- Consent.

Statute of Limitations.

-- Discovery of Defamation.

-- Publication.

-- Special Educational Programs.

 

ACCRUAL OF ACTION.

   Action brought by creditors against stockholders of insolvent corporation can accrue only at the time of a judicial declaration of insolvency. Pioneer Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Rich, 179 Ariz. 462, 880 P.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1994).

   Cable television operator's action against cable television decoding device seller for unauthorized reception of cable service was not a bar to entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff where plaintiff did not have actual knowledge of the damages caused by the seller until two months prior to filing lawsuit, when seller sold two decoders to investigator for plaintiff, notwithstanding defendant's argument that plaintiff should have been aware of seller's conduct because of its widespread magazine advertising of decoders for sale. Time Warner Cable v. Cable Box Wholesalers, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Ariz. 1996).

   A claim of bad faith by a renter against a car rental agency accrued when judgment was entered for the renter, injured as a passenger, in her negligence claim against the driver who was an authorized additional driver. Uyleman v. D.S. Rentco, 194 Ariz. 300, 981 P.2d 1081 (Ct. App. 1999).

 

LIABILITY CREATED BY STATUTE.

   A cause of action brought pursuant to §  24-521, Arizona's "dog bite statute," is governed by the time limitations contained in subsection 3 of this section. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

   Claim of negligent conduct arising from doing act required by the state was governed by subsection 3. Jackson v. Pima County, 159 Ariz. 331, 767 P.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1988); Owens v. City of Phoenix, 180 Ariz. 402, 884 P.2d 1100 (Ct. App. 1994).

   Failure to comply with the requirements of §  28-324, subsection A, does not entitle a car rental company to demand that the injured party sue them to establish the joint and several liability provided by §  28-324, subsection B, before first obtaining the judgment for damages caused by a renter's negligence; it is only after an injured party establishes the right to receive damages that the cause of action against the car rental company accrues for the purposes of application of subsection 3 of this section. Clark v. DS Rentco, Inc., 175 Ariz. 233, 854 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1993).

   Because a claim for relocation benefits is statutory in nature, such a claim is subject to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in paragraph 3. Owens v. City of Phoenix, 180 Ariz. 402, 884 P.2d 1100 (Ct. App. 1994).

   Where plaintiff filed a cause of action against an establishment for selling intoxicating beverages to a motorist who was involved in an automobile accident with plaintiff, the two-year statute of limitations in §  12-542(1) applied to plaintiff's common law cause of action instead of the one-year limitations period in subsection (5). Andrews v. Eddie's Place, Inc., 199 Ariz. 240, 16 P.3d 801 (Ct. App. 2000).

 

LIBEL AND SLANDER.

 

--IN GENERAL.

   Pure opinion is not actionable in Arizona. Glaze v. Marcus, 151 Ariz. 538, 729 P.2d 342 (Ct. App. 1986).

 

--CONSENT.

   Even if the contents of the letter were republished, consent by the injured party to its publication by way of testimony at the hearing was a complete defense to the action for defamation. Glaze v. Marcus, 151 Ariz. 538, 729 P.2d 342 (Ct. App. 1986).

 

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

 

--DISCOVERY OF DEFAMATION.

   The rule of discovery should be applied in those situations in which a defamation is published in a manner in which it is peculiarly likely to be concealed from the plaintiff, such as in a confidential memorandum or a credit report. Clark v. Airesearch Mfg. Co., 138 Ariz. 240, 673 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1983).

 

--PUBLICATION.

   This section bars a complaint filed more than one year after sending a letter for defamation based on the content of that letter. Glaze v. Marcus, 151 Ariz. 538, 729 P.2d 342 (Ct. App. 1986).

   The statute of limitations for libel and slander commences to run upon publication. Boatman v. Samaritan Health Servs., 168 Ariz. 207, 812 P.2d 1025 (Ct. App. 1990).

 

--SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS.

   In appeal to determine the extent to which a public school district must pay for services related to the education of a handicapped student when those services conflict with an educational program offered by the school district and when the program as offered provides a free, appropriate, public education, the appropriate statute of limitation is not the 35-day statute of limitations for reviewing agency decisions in §  12-904; the appropriate statute of limitations is the one-year period permitted for "liabilities created by statute, other than penalty or forfeiture" in this section. Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994).